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Inverse Condemnation as a
Remedy for "Regulatory Takings"
By ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM*
I. Introduction: The Fourteenth Amendment and
Regulatory Takings
The traditional recourse of landowners and land developers
whose plans for profitable development of land are blocked by re-
strictive zoning or other land use regulations is a suit to invalidate
the regulations on constitutional grounds. The constitutional chal-
lenge is almost always based on the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause and/or the due process or "taking" provision in the
constitution of the state where the land sought to be developed is
situated. It is usually asserted that the challenged regulations
amount to a de facto "taking" of the challenger's property for pub-
lic use without payment of just compensation.1 Although the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly
prohibit such takings, it has been well-settled since 1897 that the
due process 8clause incorporates the Fifth Amendment's express
prohibition of such takings and makes it applicable to state ac-
* S.B., 1942, J.D., 1948, Harvard University. Professor of Law, University of Michigan
School of Law.
1. This paper is not primarily concerned with the broad problem of constitutional
standards for determining when, if ever, a land use regulation should be held to amount to a
de facto taking of private property. Rather, it is concerned with the narrower question of
whether compensation should be awarded when such a taking is found to have occurred.
The modem literature on the broader question is extensive. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); F. BossELMAN, D. CALLiES & J. BANTA, TIHE TAKING
IssUE (study for the Council on Environment Quality, 1973); PLANNING WITHOUT PRIcEs (B.
Siegan ed. 1977) (papers from land use conference in San Diego, Oct. 4-6, 1975); Berger, A
Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1974); Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"
Law, 80 HA~v. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 149
(1964); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971). See also
W. STOEBUCK, NoNTREsPAssoRY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 6 (1977).
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tion.2 On the other hand, although not all state constitutions con-
tain a due process clause, all but three state constitutions expressly
prohibit the taking of private property for public use without pay-
ment of just compensation, and those three have been judicially
construed to require compensation when private property is taken
for public use.4
Despite chronic confusion in judicial language in cases where
zoning or other land use regulations are challenged under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is clear that such
regulations may be held invalid on substantive due process
grounds without a finding that they amount to a de facto taking,
sometimes termed a "regulatory taking."5 A court may properly
find that a landowner has been deprived of property without sub-
stantive due process, although the regulations are only moderately
restrictive, if (1) the purpose of the regulations is found to be im-
proper-i.e., the purpose is not to protect public health, safety or
welfare-or (2) the means chosen to effect a proper purpose are
not rationally related to the end sought to be achieved. In such
cases, courts tend to say that the regulations are invalid because
they are "arbitrary," "capricious," "unreasonable" and/or "not
substantially related to the public health, safety or welfare," not
because the regulations amount to an uncompensated regulatory
2. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Some writers con-
clude that in Chicago, the Court found an independent due process requirement that com-
pensation be paid, rather than a literal incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's taking
clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrru-
TIONAL LAW 412-15 (1978). Some confusion results from loose judicial statements that chal-
lenges to local land use regulations alleging a de facto taking are based on the Fifth
Amendment.
3. 1 P. NiCHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.3, at 78-79 (3d ed. J. Sackman rev.
1979) [hereinafter cited as EMINENT Do?.uIN]. The three states are Kansas, North Carolina
and Virginia. The Kansas Constitution expressly requires compensation when private corpo-
rations acquire land for right of way use. KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 4.
4. EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 3, at §§ 1.3, 4.8.
5. The pattern was set in Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), where the
Court held residential use zoning invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because, ac-
cording to the findings of a special master appointed by the trial court, this zoning classifi-
cation did not promote "the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabi-
tants of the part of the city affected." Id. at 188. The Court also noted that it was "pretty
clear that because of the industrial and railroad purposes to which the immediately adjoin-
ing lands ... have been developed and for which they are zoned, the locus is of compara-
tively little value for the limited uses permitted by the ordinance," but the Court did not
say that the residential use zoning amounted to a de facto taking. Id. at 187.
6. E.g., Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955).
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taking. Cases of this kind are not very common.
In most of the cases where a landowner claims that land use
regulations amount to an uncompensated de facto taking of prop-
erty, the regulations have substantially restricted the uses to which
the property may be put, and consequently have substantially re-
duced its value.7 In such cases, the United States Supeme Court
has not established clear standards for determining when a land
use regulation amounts to an uncompensated de facto taking. Prior
to Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon," the Court seemingly would
not invalidate a land use regulation as a taking, no matter how
much financial loss it caused the landowner, provided the regula-
tion had a proper purpose and employed means that were ration-
ally related to the achievement of that purpose. 9 But the Court's
opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co., written by Justice Holmes, as-
serted that when diminution in "values incident to property...
7. Usually the challenger asserts both that the zoning is "arbitrary," "capricious,"
and/or "unreasonable," and that it is so restrictive as to amount to a de facto taking. E.g.,
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. at 183. In Nectow, the lower court stated that "the
contention of plaintiff is that the zoning ordinance is unreasonable, an indefensible invasion
of his rights, deprives him of equal protection of the laws, and takes his property without
due process of law." Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 260 Mass. 441, 443, 157 N.E. 618, 619
(1927), afl'd, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
8. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute forbidding "the
mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of... any structure used
as a human habitation" except "where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying
coal and is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property be-
longing to any other person." Id. at 412-13. The plaintiff held title to the surface of a tract
of land under a deed that expressly reserved to the grantor coal company the right to re-
move all the coal beneath the surface and waived all claims for damage that might arise
from mining out all the coal.
9. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting brick manufac-
turing upheld); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting
livery stable business upheld); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting the
liquor business upheld). In Hadacheck, the plaintiff alleged that he owned a bed of clay
worth about $800,000 for brick-making, but only worth about $60,000 for any other use; and
that the ordinance prohibiting brick-making would completely preclude use of his clay for
brick-making because he could no longer make bricks at the place where the clay was lo-
cated and the clay could not economically be transported to another location. In holding the
ordinance valid, the Court treated the plaintiff's inability to continue using his clay for
brick-making as giving rise to a mere "consequential loss," not a "taking," because there was
"no prohibition of the removal of the brick clay, only a prohibition within the designated
locality of its manufacture into bricks." 239 U.S. at 412. The Hadacheck opinion also said
that the police power is "one of the most essential powers of government, one that is the
least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, usually is on some individual, but
the imperative necessity for its existence precludes any limitation upon it when not exerted
arbitrarily." Id. at 410.
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reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
[governmental] act,"10 and that "if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."11 Unfortunately the Court did not, either
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. or in later land use cases, clarify its stan-
dard for deciding whether a particular regulation "goes too far."12
10. 260 U.S. at 413.
11. Id. at 415. The majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co., by Justice Holmes,
does not cite Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock,
237 U.S. 171 (1915); or Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In dissent, Justice Brandeis,
citing Mugler and Hadacheck, asserted that the Pennsylvania statute was valid because its
purpose was to protect the public, and the prohibition of mining so as to cause subsidence
was an appropriate means of protecting the public. Brandeis further asserted that "restric-
tion upon use does not become inappropriate as a means, merely because it deprives the
owner of the only use to which the property can be profitably put." 260 U.S. at 418 (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
12. The majority opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. does not indicate how much of the
defendant's coal would have to be left in place as a result of the Pennsylvania statute, what
the value of that coal was, or the relative values of that coal and the defendant's total hold-
ings of anthracite coal. In dissent, Justice Brandeis said:
"If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should
compare it with the value ... not of the coal alone, but with the value of the whole prop-
erty. For aught that appears the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction may be
negligible as compared with the value of the whole property [of the coal company], or even
as compared with that part of it which is represented by the coal remaining in place and
which may be extracted despite the statute." Id. at 419 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that the Pennsylvania statute only prohibited "the mining of anthra-
cite coal in such a way as to cause ... subsidence." It did not expressly require owners of
coal to leave any coal in place, but the cost of providing artifical supports would have ex-
ceeded the value of the coal that would otherwise have to be left in place. Id. at 395. This
made it "commercially impracticable" to mine all the coal and substitute artificial supports
to prevent subsidence. Thus it can be argued that, as in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915), the defendant's loss was only "consequential."
After Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), the Court did not review an-
other land use control case until 1962. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962), the Court sustained an ordinance prohibiting sand and gravel excavations below the
water table.
"If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact that
it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional ....
This is not to say, however, that governmental action ... cannot be so onerous as to consti-
tute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation. [citations omitted] There is no
set formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins. Although a comparison
of values before and after is relevant, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, [260 U.S. 393
(1922)], it is by no means conclusive, see Hadacheck v. Sebastian, [239 U.S. 394 (1915)],
where a diminution in value from $800,000 to $60,000 was upheld. How far regulation may
go before it becomes a taking we need not now decide, for there is no evidence in the pres-
ent record which even remotely suggests that prohibition of further mining will reduce the
value of the lot in question." Id. at 594 (footnote omitted). In view of the Court's statement
that nothing in the record "even remotely suggesti that prohibition of further mining will
reduce the value of the lot in question," one wonders why the Court reviewed the case at all.
[Vol. 8:517
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The Court's most recent excursion into the field of land use regula-
tions, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,13 re-
sulted in an opinion that, as Professor Mandelker notes in his sym-
posium article, "wavered between taking, equal protection and due
process doctrine"; 14 but it seems at least to establish that, where
the purpose of a very restrictive regulation is proper and the
means employed are otherwise rational, it will not be held an un-
compensated de facto taking if it leaves the landowner with "rea-
sonable beneficial use" of the property5 and he is not "solely bur-
dened and unbenefited" by the regulation.""
II. Inverse Condemnation and Regulatory Takings
in California
Cases where the effect of zoning or other land use regulations
is to preclude any "reasonable beneficial use" of the land and re-
On the issue of "reasonableness" (substantive due process), the Court decided for the mu-
nicipality because the landowner had not met the burden of showing that the regulations
were clearly unreasonable, although their effect was to require termination of a lawfully
established nonconforming use.
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (upholding New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law as
applied to the Grand Central Terminal). The City Landmarks Commission refused to ap-
prove the plans of Penn Central to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal
building as destructive of the Terminal's historic and aesthetic features. Penn Central, with-
out seeking judicial review of the Commission's decision, sued in state court claiming that
the application of the Landmarks Law to the Terminal amounted to a taking of property
without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and an arbi-
trary deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Penn Central sought, in the alternative, compensation for the taking or declar-
atory and injunctive relief. The New York Court of Appeals sustained the Landmarks Law
generally and its application to the Terminal specifically. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, af'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
491, 500 (1981).
15. 438 U.S. at 138.
16. Id. at 134. In a detailed survey of its prior decisions the Court indicated that a de
facto taking may be found when a regulation frustrates "distinct investment-backed expec-
tations." Id. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). The Court
also stated that "Government actions that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources
to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute 'tak-
ings."' Id. at 128 (citing Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Causby v. United
States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); and
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917)). None of the cases cited for the "acquisitory
action" basis for finding a taking involved a land use regulation; they all involved either
trespasses in private airspace plus serious interference with surface use (Causby, Griggs and
Portsmouth) or flooding (Cress).
Spring 1981]
522 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
duce its value nearly to zero are rare, but are becoming more fre-
quent as a result of attempts in recent years to use land use regula-
tions to control urban expansion and to preserve wetlands, flood
plains and coastal areas from environmentally harmful develop-
ment.117 In California, where earlier court decisions uniformly re-
jected landowner challenges based on the regulatory taking argu-
ment, even in cases where land use regulations appeared to
prohibit any reasonable use of property, 8 landowners recently be-
gan suing for compensation on an inverse condemnation theory.
This theory apparently was advanced to give the California courts
an alternative to either upholding harsh land use regulations im-
plementing important public policies or invalidating such regula-
17. There is great disparity in the state court cases as to exactly where the line be-
tween valid regulation and de facto taking should be drawn. Professors Krasnowiecki and
Strong concluded in 1963, after an examination of cases where values were stated, that "the
average breaking point between valid regulation and 'taking' is at a loss of two-thirds of the
admitted value for some other use." Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regulations for
Open Space, 29 J. Am. INST. PLANNERS 87, 89 (1963). Compare the conclusion of Professor
Anderson in 1976:
"Examination of a representative group of cases in which the courts specifically men-
tioned proof of the value of the subject land if used for a permitted purpose, as compared
with its value if used for a purpose outlawed by the ordinance, did not yield a precise
formula for determining where regulation crosses the line and becomes confiscation. Of the
cases examined, about half approved and half disapproved the ordinance as applied. More-
over, the loss of use value in cases where the ordinance was approved was about the same as
in those where an opposite conclusion was reached. If any conclusion is warranted by this
sampling, it is that financial loss is a relevant consideration, but not a single decisive one." 1
R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.27 (2d ed. 1976).
Professor Berger suggests these two conclusions are not necessarily inconsistent:
"There obviously has to be a mathematical average breaking point between cases where
compensation is and is not required. However, this figure is not necessarily meaningful. If,
for example, compensation were required in three different cases where there were, respec-
tively, a one-third loss, a two-thirds loss and a total loss, the average breaking point would
be two-thirds. This figure would not mean much, particularly if there had been three other
cases of similar losses where no compensation was allowed." Berger, A Policy Analysis of
the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 165, 175 n.35 (1974).
18. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342,
20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (upholding prohibition of rock, sand
and gravel mining on land found to have "economic value only for the excavation of rock,
sand and gravel" and "no appreciable economic value for any of the uses permitted" by the
zoning ordinance); McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932
(1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954) (upholding zoning of privately owned beach land
for "beach recreation" only); Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 132 P. 584 (1913), aff'd sub
nom. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). For a discussion of why California land
use control decisions have "quite consistently been far rougher on the property rights of
developers than those in any other state," see 1 N. WInLiAsS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING
LAw § 6.03 (1974).
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tions as regulatory takings, and the California intermediate appel-
late courts have accepted the inverse condemnation theory with
enthusiasm. The most important cases, all involving open space
zoning classifications imposed by local governments under the au-
thority of the 1970 California "open space" legislation,1 are El-
dridge v. City of Palo Alto,20 Beyer v. City of Palo Alto,22 Agins v.
City of Tiburon2 2 and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego.2 3
In Eldridge,2 ' plaintiff had purchased land in the Palo Alto
foothills area when it was zoned for single-family residential use on
one-acre lots; later, after the foothills area was designated as "open
space" on the City's general plan, that area, including plaintiff's
land, was rezoned as open space, which only permitted single-fam-
ily residential use on ten-acre lots.2 5 Plaintiff then brought an in-
verse condemnation action alleging that the open space zoning
amounted to a de facto taking, but not alleging that the zoning
19. CA r. Gov'T CODS §§ 65560-65570, 65910-65912 (West Supp. 1979).
20. 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (App. 1975), vacated on remand, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1976).
21. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976) (decided with Eldridge on remand).
22. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), af'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
23. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (App. 1978), rev'd on remand without published opinion, 4 Civ.
No. 16277 (filed June 25, 1979), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 49 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1981).
24. 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (App. 1975), vacated on remand, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1976).
25. This was one of the ultimate results of Palo Alto's annexation in 1959 of about
6,000 acres of virtually undeveloped rolling foothills, all privately owned, west of the city.
The City later acquired some land in the upper foothills and established a public park there.
During 1969 the City began land use studies of the foothills area and, on June 7, 1971,
adopted an amendment to its General Plan reclassifying over 90% of the undeveloped foot-
hills area (over 5,900 acres, including plaintiff's property) to an "Open Space and/or Conser-
vation and Park" designation. Although there is no mention of the fact in the Eldridge
opinions, city officials proceeded to plan for acquisition of the foothills area "below the
Park" during the first six months of 1971, and on July 19, 1971, the City Council imposed a
moratorium on development in the area "below the Park." In February 1972, the develop-
ment dnoratorium was extended for another six months. Apparently the Eldridge property
was subject to the moratoria, but it is not clear whether it was included in the land planned
for acquisition by the City. However, on October 4, 1971, the City Planning Staff reported
to the City Council that the receipt of federal funds to aid in the acquisition of land in the
lower foothills was unlikely. Shortly after the extension of the development moratorium, the
City Council apparently decided that acquisition with city funds would be too expensive. On
June 5, 1972, while the second moratorium was still in effect, the City added a new "O-S"
(Open Space) classification to its zoning ordinance, and on August 14, 1972, shortly before
the moratorium expired, the plaintiffs 750 acre tract was rezoned to that classification.
(Most of these facts are derived from Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F.
Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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classification was invalid. The trial court sustained a demurrer to
the complaint. The intermediate appellate court reversed, holding
that plaintiff had stated a cause of action for recovery of compen-
sation.28 On further appeal to the California Supreme Court, the
case was remanded for reconsideration in light of the supreme
court's opinion in HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court,27 where the su-
preme court held that an inverse condemnation action could not be
predicated on an allegation of "mere reduction in market value" of
plaintiff's land resulting from its "downzoning" from a commercial
to a single-family residential classification. A footnote in the HFH
opinion, however, stated: "This case does not present, and we
therefore do not decide, the question of entitlement to compensa-
tion in the event a zoning regulation forbade substantially all use
of the land in question. We leave the question for another day."28
On remand, relying on this dictum, the intermediate appellate
court again held that Eldridge had stated a cause of action in in-
verse condemnation.2 9 And the court reached the same conclusion
in Beyer,30 which it disposed of, together with Eldridge, in a single
opinion.
In Beyer the facts were the same as in Eldridge, but Beyer,
unlike Eldridge, claimed that the Palo Alto open space zoning was
invalid and sought, in the alternative, either compensation or a
declaration of invalidity. The court was thus forced to articulate
the rationale of its decision more clearly than it had in its first
Eldridge opinion. The rationale was that the Palo Alto open space
regulations "were valid exercises of the state's police power and
beyond constitutional or other attack except . .. in proceedings
for damages in inverse condemnation."31 Consequently, Beyer's
26. 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (App. 1975), vacated on remand, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1976).
27. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976).
28. 15 Cal. 3d at 518 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244 n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16. But ef. id.
at 521-22, 542 P.2d at 246-47, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75, where the court indicated that it
thought the responsibility for redefining constitutional standards for regulatory takings
should rest with the legislature.
29. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976).
30. Id.
31. 57 Cal. App. 3d at 631, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586. It is clear that the court shifted its
position on the Eldridge remand. In its first opinion, the court quoted from EMINENT Do-
MAIN, supra note 3, at § 1.42:
"Not only is an actual physical appropriation, under an attempted exercise of the police
power, in practical effect an exercise of the power of eminent domain, but if regulative legis-
[Vol. 8:517
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complaint stated a cause of action for compensation but not for
invalidating the regulations.
The rationale of Eldridge and Beyer is startling, and certainly
finds little support in the United States Supreme Court cases, the
earlier 'California cases, or the lower federal court cases cited by
the court-a fact that is demonstrated in considerable detail in the
dissenting opinion by Judge Sims8" and by commentators in legal
periodicals.8 In all of the United States Supreme Court cases cited
by the court, the issue was simply whether the challenged land use
regulations were invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment as de
facto takings, and none of these cases actually holds that a "partic-
ularly harsh" regulation may be held valid, and nevertheless "give
rise to damages in inverse condemnation. '3 4 Although compensa-
tion was either actually awarded or held to be recoverable in sev-
eral California cases and in two United States District Court cases
relied upon in the Eldridge-Beyer opinion, all of these cases are
distinguishable on the ground that they involved either inequitable
precondemnation activities-e.g., long, unreasonable delays in the
condemnation proceedings, or downzoning to depress the value of
plaintiff's property prior to its acquisition by defendant-or an ac-
tual public use of plaintiff's property as a result of defendant's ac-
tions. Moreover, none of these cases adopted the notion that com-
pensation should be awarded because the plaintiff's property was
taken by means of a valid land use regulation.
Since the two United States District Court cases mentioned
above, Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto 5 and
Dahl v.City of Palo Alto,36 were based on the same Palo Alto open
lation is so unreasonable or arbitrary as to deprive a person of the complete use and enjoy-
ment of his property, it comes within the purview of the law of eminent domain. Such legis-
lation is an invalid exercise of the police power since it is clearly unreasonable and
arbitrary. It is invalid as an exerdise of the power of eminent domain since no provision is
made for compensation." 124 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55 (emphasis added). In its second opinion,
however, the court omitted the last two sentences in the passage quoted above. 57 Cal. App.
3d at 627, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
32. Id. at 635, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
33. Bozung, Judicially Created Zoning With Compensation: California's Brief Exper-
iment With Inverse Condemnation, 10 ENVW'L L. Rav. 67, 77-85 (1979); Hall, Eldridge v.
City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law, 28 HASTINGs L.J. 1569,
1574-94 (1977).
34. See notes 8-12 and accompanying text supra.
35. 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
36. 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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space zoning regulations involved in Eldridge and Beyer, the court
may have felt that the same result was called for in Eldridge and
Beyer. But in Arastra, where compensation was actually awarded,
the court concluded that the open space zoning "was not a bona
fide attempt to impose limitations on the use of the property of the
plaintiff, but rather the final step in a program designed to acquire
rights over the property for the enjoyment and use of the public in
general."3 And the plaintiff in Dahl, where the inverse condemna-
tion complaint survived a motion to dismiss, alleged that Palo Alto
had taken earlier action, in addition to downzoning her land to the
open space classification, for the purpose of reducing the value of
the land should it later be condemned.3 8 In Eldridge and Beyer,
however, there were no allegations of inequitable precondemnation
activity by the City-indeed, the Eldridge-Beyer opinion does not
even mention the City's abortive plan to acquire lands in the foot-
hills area-and the decision rests simply on the theory that com-
pensation is payable when a valid land use regulation deprives the
landowners of "any reasonable or beneficial use of their land."39
37. 401 F. Supp. at 978-79. The basis of the decision is summarized in the following
passage:
"The basic question of law, then is this: If a city with power to do so, decides to acquire
property to preserve scenic beauty, open space and the view from a public park and city
roads, takes substantially all steps toward doing so, short of payment, leads the public and
property owners to believe that the acquisition is inevitable, delays all development of the
property while preparing for acquisition, and then, when it has determined that the cost is
higher than h'oped, on the pretense of protecting against non-existent hazards found to exist
without substantial evidence, enacts a zoning ordinance, accomplishing all of the purposes
of the acquisition, which purports to allow uses of property which are not economically real-
istic, with no inquiry as to the economic feasibility of the purported uses, is the resultant
loss of value to the property affected compensable? The answer must be 'yes."' Id. at 981.
For some of the common factual background of Eldridge, Beyer, Arastra and Dahl, see note
25 supra. The Arastra Court held that Palo Alto must pay the full value of a fee simple
estate in Arastra's land "on the effective date of the Open Space Ordinance," the amount to
be determined by a jury. Id. Subsequently, before trial of the compensation issue, the City
settled with Arastra for $7,500,000.
38. The plaintiff alleged that the development moratoria imposed by the City were
intended to reduce the value of her land prior to its acquisition. She also alleged that "au-
thorized agents of the City induced her and other similarly situated property owners to
allow annexation of their property by promising that the zoning would remain essentially
the same (one-acre minimum lot size) and that development would be permitted as soon as
utilities could be extended to their property," and that after annexation the plaintiff was
assessed for the installation of sewer and water facilities on the basis of development at a
density of one dwelling per acre. 372 F. Supp. at 648.
39. "Among the many factual issues to be resolved in the cases before us is whether
the 10-acre homesites of plaintiffs' land are salable at all. This question would seem to be of
particular significance, since the same homesites are designated by the ordinances for 'open
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In Agins v. City of Tiburon,"' the plaintiffs, like the plaintiff
in Beyer, sued in the alternative for compensation on an inverse
condemnation theory or to invalidate the "residential planned de-
velopment and open space" classification to which their land had
been rezoned pursuant to the open space element in the City's gen-
eral plan. No doubt the plaintiffs were encouraged by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's refusal to review Eldridge and Beyer after its
remand of Eldridge to the intermediate appellate court. However,
the plaintiffs in Agins did not argue that the open space zoning
was invalid because it was "too harsh." Instead, they argued that,
"by permitting single-family residential use," the zoning "is not
sufficiently restrictive" to comply with the California open space
legislation of 1970!4 ' The complaint was held insufficient on de-
murrer insofar as it alleged invalidity of the open space zoning on
the ground just stated, but it was held sufficient insofar as it stated
an inverse condemnation claim based on allegations that the resi-
dential planned development and open space zoning (which al-
lowed single-family houses on lots of one to five acres) precluded
space use,' including public park and recreation purposes and 'wildlife habitat.' Other fac-
tual inquiries would concern: the extent, and impact, of the intrusion upon plaintiff's prop-
erty by the 'paths and trails system' planned to allow 'public access through the Foothills
lands'; whether there is any reasonable basis for the ordinances' declared aims of encourag-
ing agricultural usage, preserving natural resources and creating wildlife sanctuaries on the
land; and generally, the reasonableness of the ordinances' concept that although the foot-
hills may be subdivided into 10-acre homesites, they must nevertheless without compensa-
tion therefor remain 'open space' according to the definitions and usages of Government
Code section 65560." 57 Cal. App. 3d at 628, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
Since neither the Palo Alto General Plan nor its zoning ordinance purported to author-
ize affirmative public use of the plaintiffs' land, the court's references to public park and
recreational use of the plaintiffs' land, use for a "wildlife habitat," and the proposed "paths
and trails system" must have been based on the court's assumption that the City would, in
the future, renew its effort to acquire the foothills lands-or at least to acquire enough land
for the "paths and trails system"--which might have a depressive effect on the present
value of the plaintiffs' land. But these references do not seem to justify the suggestions in
later cases that "[tihe spectre conjured up by the various Palo Alto regulations and planning
statements that property owners might be required to maintain some kind of public outdoor
zoo to be traversed by hikers and birdwatehers," rather than diminution in the value of the
plaintiffs' land, was the real basis of the Eldridge-Beyer decisions. Furey v. City of Sacra-
mento, 146 Cal. Rptr. 485, 493 (App. 1978), vacated, 85 Cal. App. 3d 464, 149 Cal. Rptr. 541
(1978). See also Helix Land Co. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683
(1978); Pan Pac. Properties v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. App. 3d 244, 146 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 145 Cal. Rptr. 476 (App. 1978), rev'd, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598
P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
40. 145 Cal. Rptr. 476 (App. 1978), rev'd, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 153 Cal. Rptr.
224 (1979).
41. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 478-79.
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any reasonable use of the plaintiff's property and that the City had
engaged in "significant precondemnation activities" amounting to
"unfair conduct." The intermediate appellate court relied on El-
dridge as establishing that "a valid zoning ordinance could operate
so oppressively as to deny any reasonable use to the owner" and
thus entitle the owner to compensation. 2
When the Agins case was reviewed by the California Supeme
Court, the decision of the intermediate appellate court was re-
versed.4 The court said (1) that "a landowner alleging that a zon-
ing ordinance has deprived him of substantially all use of his land
may attempt through declaratory relief or mandamus to invalidate
the ordinance," but "may not. . elect to sue in inverse condem-
nation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power
into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain
must be paid";44 (2) that the rezoning of the plaintiffs' property to
the residential planned development and open space classification
"did not unconstitutionally interfere with plaintiffs' entire use of
the land or impermissibly decrease its value";" and (3) that the
City's "precondemnation activities" did not provide a separate ba-
sis for inverse condemnation." 4 With respect to the latter holding,
the court pointed out that the plaintiffs' reliance on Klopping v.
City of Whittier'7-where a plaintiff recovered for the decline in
market value of his property as the result of an unreasonable delay
in instituting eminent domain proceedings following announce-
ment of intent to condemn and other unreasonable conduct-was
misplaced. In Agins, the court noted, "there was no such delay or
conduct. '48
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the California Supreme Court in Agins, 9 holding that Tiburon's
open space zoning ordinances "neither prevent the best use of ap-
pellant's land [single-family residential use] . . . nor extinguish a
fundamental attribute of ownership," and leave appellants "free to
42. Id. at 481. The court noted "it can be argued that the actual 'taking' in Eldridge
was not the downzoning but the path and trail system" Id. at 481 n.7. See note 39 supra.
43. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
44. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
45. Id. at 277, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
46. Id. at 277-78, 598 P.2d at 31-32, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
47. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
48. 24 Cal. 3d at 278, 598 P.2d at 31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
49. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a
development plan to local officials."50 Moreover, the Court said,
"[t]he zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the pub-
lic by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly de-
velopment of residential property with provision for open space ar-
eas" and there was "no indication that the appellants' 5-acre tract
is the only property affected by the ordinances"; so this was not a
case where the appellants were "solely burdened and unbenefited"
by the land use regulations.5 1 Since no taking had occurred, the
Court said that it need not consider "whether a State may limit
the remedies available to a person whose land has been taken with-
out just compensation. '5 And, in a footnote, the Court approved
the California Supreme Court's holding that Tiburon's "good-faith
planning activities, which did not result in successful prosecution
of an eminent domain claim [because the proposed bond issue
failed], [did not] so burden the appellants' enjoyment of their
property as to constitute a taking. ' '51
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego 5 was an
inverse condemnation suit instituted before the initial decision of
the intermediate appellate court in Eldridge was handed down.
The utility company sued the City to recover the value of land
allegedly taken by virtue of its designation as open space on the
City's general plan, the downzoning of part of the land from an
industrial to an agricultural (holding zone) classification, and cer-
tain precondemnation activities of the City.5 5 In the alternative,
50. Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 263.
53. Id. at 263 n. 9.
54. 146 Cal. Rptr. 103 (App. 1978), rev'd on remand without published opinion, 4 Civ.
No. 16277 (filed June 25, 1979), dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 49 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1981).
55. The utility company assembled a parcel of about 412 acres in 1966. In June 1973,
the city adopted the open space element of its General Plan, which designated 228 acres of
the 412-acre parcel as "open space." These 228 acres were "at low elevation," in "a drainage
basin, tidal basin or flood plain ... subject to standing water or 'ponding'; part is subject to
ocean tidal action and portions have been referred to as the Los Penasquitos Lagoon, an
estuary and wildlife refuge; a portion is within the State Coastal Act zone." 146 Cal. Rptr. at
109. Between 1966 and 1973, these 228 acres were zoned as follows: 116 acres as Industrial
(M-1A) and 112 acres as Agricultural holding zone (A-i-i). In June 1973, two weeks before
the open space element of the General Plan was adopted, the city downzoned 39 of the 116
acres previously zoned Industrial (M-1A) to Agricultural (A--10), and 50 of the 112 acres
still zoned Agricultural holding zone (A-i-i) were designated as "to be considered for future
industrial use." In September 1973, the City adopted a staff report entitled "Park Reserve
Systems," which discussed the financing and acquisition of park lands and proposed a bond
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the company sought mandamus and declaratory relief. The trial
court dismissed the alternative claim before trial, but awarded
plaintiff a judgment for $3,169,996, representing the fee simple
value of 228 acres of land plus severance damages and appraisal,
engineering and attorneys' fees. This judgment was affirmed by the
intermediate appellate court in an opinion handed down about two
years after the final Eldridge-Beyer opinion was issued and about
a month after the decision of the intermediate appellate court in
Agins.
In San Diego, the intermediate appellate court accepted the
plaintiff's argument that, regardless of the actual zoning of its
land-about one-third of which remained zoned for industrial use
after the downzoning occurred 56-designation of the land as "open
space" on the City's general plan precluded use of any of the land
for industrial development because-although San Diego, as a
charter city, was not legally bound to make its zoning consistent
with its general plan7-the City had, in fact, adopted a policy of
prohibiting land development inconsistent with its general plan.5"
Hence, the court held, industrial development of its land was fore-
closed and, since the land was located in "a drainage basin, tidal
basin or flood plain"59 where nothing but industrial development
was feasible, the City's actions, taken together, amounted to a tak-
ing of plaintiff's property.60 Although the plaintiff had not tried to
issue to finance the acquisition of the open space lands, including the 228 acres owned by
the utility company. The bond proposal failed to pass when submitted to the voters.
56. See note 55 supra.
57. The requirement of consistency between the zoning and the general plan, imposed
by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West 1979), did not apply to a charter city such as San Diego
unless the city had adopted an ordinance requiring consistency. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65700,
65803 (West 1979). But see 1979 CAL. STATS. ch. 304, § 1, amending CAL. Gov'T CODE §
65860. "Notwithstanding Section 65803, this section shall apply in a charter city of
2,000,000 or more population to a zoning ordinance adopted prior to January 1, 1979, which
zoning ordinance shall be consistent with the general plan of such city by July 1, 1982." Id.
58. 146 Cal. Rptr. at 112. This finding by the court negated the City's argument that,
"[b]ecause the general plan lacks definiteness and finality, there can be no inverse condem-
nation because land falls within a certain category on an adopted plan." Id. See Selby Re-
alty Co. v. City of Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119-20, 514 P.2d 111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr.
799, 805 (1973).
59. 146 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
60. "Company presented expert witnesses who testified the land could not be used for
agriculture because of the soil's high salt content; it could not be used for residences because
the land is in a flood plan; it could not be used economically for grazing; it could not be used
for a golf course because of poor drainage. In short, the only possible use of the land was for
industrial. But, there was testimony by experts that City required zoning to be consistent
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obtain a conditional use permit and apparently had not tried to get
the City to rezone any part of its land for industrial use, the court
held that, since the plaintiff "sought only to recover damages in
inverse condemnation for a taking of its property," and "was not
trying to enjoin City from enforcing the zoning applicable to the
property," there was "no failure to exhaust any administrative
remedy since none existed."6 1 Implicitly, therefore, the court ac-
cepted the Eldridge-Beyer doctrine that inverse condemnation is
the proper remedy "if the zoning is valid but so harsh that it de-
prives the owner of all beneficial use of its land." Although the
court mentioned that a bond proposal to secure the funds needed
to acquire the lands designated as open space on the City's general
plan failed to pass, 2 this "precondemnation activity" was appar-
ently not relied on by the court in reaching its decision.
After the California Supreme Court decided the Agins case, it
remanded the San Diego case for reconsideration in light of the
intervening decision in Agins. The intermediate appellate court
then reversed the trial court's judgment with an unpublished opin-
ione which included the following cryptic statement:
[Appellant] complains it has been denied all use of its land
which is zoned for agriculture and manufacturing but lies within
the open space area of the general plan. It has not made applica-
tion to use or improve the property nor has it asked [the] City
what development might be permitted. Even assuming no use is
acceptable to the City, [appellant's] complaint deals with the al-
leged overzealous use of the police power by [the] City. Its rem-
edy is mandamus or declaratory relief, not inverse condemnation.
[Appellant] did in its complaint seek these remedies asserting
that [the] City had arbitrarily exercised its police power by enact-
ing an unconstitutional zoning law and general plan element or by
applying the zoning and general plan unconstitutionally. How-
with the general plan; the City's definitions of open space. give rise to the inference that
industrial use would not be permitted in the open space area; the City's own expert testified
that he had never seen an industrial development that would be consistent with open space
although he did not rule out the possibility entirely. The clear inference is that City would
deny any application for industrial development on this parcel because of the open space
designation on the general plan. In addition, there was expert testimony that after the open
space element was adopted, the land had no economic use and no one would buy it. This
was substantial evidence to support the court's conclusion there was inverse condemnation."
Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 113-14.
62. See note 55 supra.
63. 4 Civ. No. 16277 (unpublished opinion filed June 25, 1979).
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ever, on the present record these are disputed fact issues not cov-
ered by the trial court in its findings and conclusions. They can
be dealt with anew should [appellant] elect to retry the case."
The California Supreme Court denied further review and the
plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court, asserting
that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require payment of
just compensation whenever a land use regulation is found to
amount to a taking of private property for public use. The United
States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the San Di-
ego appeal during the same week in which it decided the Agins
case, reserving consideration of its jurisdiction until the San Diego
case was heard on the merits.
6 5
III. The San Diego Case: New Supreme Court
Doctrine on Regulatory Takings
The decision of the plaintiff to appeal the San Diego case to
the United States Supreme Court was rather surprising, since the
Court has only rarely held a local land use regulation invalid under
the Fourteenth Amendment and has never held that a regulatory
taking entitles the landowner to compensation, if he demands it,
instead of a declaration of invalidity. The plaintiff's position in
San Diego was supported only by dicta in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,6 6 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 7 and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City 8 to the effect that regula-
tion, if carried too far, will be recognized as a taking.
It will be recalled that the plaintiff's argument when the San
Diego case was first before the California intermediate appellate
court was that San Diego's general plan and zoning ordinance were
valid but nevertheless amounted to a taking of plaintiff's property
for public use which constitutionally entitled it to compensation
based on the full market value of its land. But the plaintiff seemed
to change its position somewhat when it filed its appeal with the
United States Supreme Court, for it then asserted that the restric-
tions imposed by the San Diego zoning ordinance and open space
64. Id., quoted in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 49 U.S.L.W. 4317,
4319 (1981).
65. 447 U.S. 919 (1980).
66. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See notes 8-12 and accompanying text, supra.
67. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See note 12, supra.
68. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See notes 13-16 and accompanying text, supra.
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designation were "arbitrary, excessive, and unconstitutional," in
addition to asserting that the "purported invalidation remedy
proffered by [the] California state courts" was not "constitution-
ally adequate to substitute for just compensation." 9 A further
change in the plaintiff's position occurred when the San Diego case
was orally argued on December 1, 1980. Plaintiff's counsel then in-
dicated that plaintiff was "merely seeking interim damages for a
deprivation of property without due process of law" rather than
"asking full damages for a complete taking without just compensa-
tion. '70 Thus the plaintiff abandoned its claim for the full market
value of its land as originally asserted in the trial court.
When the United States Supreme Court noted probable juris-
diction in the San Diego case, it seemed that (1) the Court might
not reach the merits on the ground that the plaintiff failed to ex-
haust its administrative and legal remedies;7 1 (2) even if the Court
reached the merits, it might find that the San Diego zoning ordi-
nance and open space classification did not deprive the plaintiff of
the "reasonable beneficial use" of its land, and thus might not
reach the compensation issue;72 and that (3) even if the Court
69. 48 U.S.L.W. 3814 (1980).
70. 33 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., No. 1, p. 4 (1981).
71. At the oral argument, in answer to suggestions from the court that the plaintiff
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it never submitted a development
plan to the city, counsel for the plaintiff argued that the trial court found that such submis-
sion would have been futile because "[tihe clear inference is that City would deny any appli-
cation for industrial development on this parcel because of the open space designation." San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 146 Cal. Rptr. 103, 113 (App. 1978). But the
trial court's finding was simply that "[n]o development could proceed on the property desig-
nated as open space unless it was consistent with open space," which does not necessitate
the inference drawn by the California intermediate appellate court. Indeed, the City's ex-
pert witness testified that a project would not be denied approval simply because it was
located within the open space zone and opined that a design for industrial use of the tract
could be consistent with the open space designation, stating, "'I haven't seen one, but I
think that's possible.'" Id. at 113 n. 5.
72. In an amicus curiae brief, the Conservation Foundation and five other environ-
mental groups argued that no taking occurred because the plaintiff (a) had never attempted
to develop the tract during the seven years between its acquisition and its designation as
open space, although the City's general plan and zoning regulations did not then preclude
industrial development; and (b) had recouped nearly all of the $3,500,000 it paid for the
tract by selling off 40 acres and by including the entire tract in its rate base. 33 LAND UsE L.
& ZONING DIG., No. 1, p. 4 (1981). Moreover, only 228 acres (including the 77 acres zoned
"industrial") of the plaintiffs 412-acre parcel were designated as "open space" on the gen-
eral plan. In deciding whether the open space designation amounted to a taking, the Court
would presumably consider the entire 412-acre parcel, since it held in Penn Central, 438
U.S. 104 (1978), that "'[tfaking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
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found that the plaintiff was deprived of the "reasonable beneficial
use" of its land, the Court was unlikely to hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment requires compensation based on the full mar-
ket value of the land."3 In fact, however, the Court voted, five to
four, to dismiss the San Diego case "because of the absence of a
final judgment" in the California courts. 4 The majority reached
this conclusion on the ground that the California intermediate ap-
pellate court intended the plaintiff to have an opportunity on re-
mand to convince the trial court to resolve the disputed issues not
covered by the trial court in its findings and conclusions."5 The
four dissenters disagreed, concluding that the second, unpublished
opinion of the California intermediate appellate court constituted
a "final judgment" and that the Court should therefore address the
merits of the issue presented on the appeal."6
This writer believes that the dissenters are correct in their
conclusion that the judgment appealed in the San Diego case was a
final judgment. But the fact that gives Justice Brennan's dissent-
ing opinion major importance is that his conclusions on the merits
were supported by the three justices who concurred in his opinion
and that Justice Rehnquist, who voted with the majority on the
"final judgment" issue, stated that if he had been satisfied that the
appeal was from a final judgment he "would have had little diffi-
culty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opin-
ion of JUSTICE BRENNAN. ' 1 7 It therefore appears that Justice Bren-
nan's conclusions on the compensation issue may have the support
of a majority of the Court.
Briefly stated, Justice Brennan's conclusions are as follows:
(1) "[O]nce a court establishes that there was a regulatory
'taking,' the Constitution demands that the government entity pay
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been en-
tirely abrogated." Id. at 130. But cf. American Say. & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 637
F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1980).
73. See discussion of earlier Supreme Court cases dealing with regulatory takings,
notes 8-16 and accompanying text, supra.
74. 49 U.S.L.W. 4317 (1981). Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Burger, C.J., and White, Stevens & Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a
separate concurring opinion. Justice Brennan fied a dissenting opinion, in which Stewart,
Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined.
75. See opinion of Blackmun, J., 49 U.S.L.W. at 4317, and concurring opinion of
Rehnquist, J., id. at 4320.
76. See dissenting opinion of Brennan, J., id. at 4321.
77. Id. at 4320 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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just compensation for the period commencing on the date the
regulation first effected the 'taking,' and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regu-
lation";78 but
(2) "contrary to appellant's claim that San Diego must for-
mally condemn its property and pay full fair market value, nothing
in the Just Compensation Clause empowers a court to order a gov-
ernment entity to condemn the property and pay its full fair mar-
ket value, where the 'taking' already effected is temporary and re-
versible and the government wants to halt the 'taking.' Just as the
government may cancel condemnation proceedings before passage
of title, . . . or abandon property it has temporarily occupied or
invaded,. it must have the same power to rescind a regulatory
'taking.' ,M9
The second conclusion should be slightly modified to make it
clear that courts may terminate a "temporary" regulatory taking
by declaring the regulation invalid, and that formal action by the
local governing body to "rescind" or "amend" is not required. As
thus modified, the rule stated by Justice Brennan should command
wide support. Those who have advocated allowing the landowner
to require a local government to pay the full market value of the
land as compensation for a regulatory taking usually advance some
or all of the following arguments:80
(1) Land use regulations that result in a taking of private
property should be subject to attack in the same manner as any
other taking of private property for public use without payment of
just compensation.
(2) As long as privately owned land can be drastically re-
stricted in its uses without cost to the public when land use regula-
tions are held invalid, the economic impact of such regulations is
not likely to be seriously considered when the decision to adopt the
regulations is made.
78. Id. at 4325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 4327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
80. See, e.g., Baumgardner, "Takings" Under the Police Power-The Development of
Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordinances, 30 Sw. L.J. 723,
736-38 (1976); Swank, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in Property Value
as Compensable Damage, 28 STA. L. REv. 779 (1976); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its
Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STA. L. Rav. 1439,
1444-45 (1974).
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(3) Invalidation of overly harsh land use regulations is not an
adequate remedy because the local governing body can easily frus-
trate the "victorious" landowner by adopting slightly different reg-
ulations which still preclude any reasonable use of his property.
(4) Invalidation of overly harsh land use regulations often
leaves the landowner with substantial uncompensated losses even
if the ultimate result is to allow him a reasonable use of his land.
The first argument above is essentially an argument for logical
symmetry of remedies in all kinds of taking cases, and has been
persuasively refuted in Professor Mandelker's symposium article.81
The second argument-a policy argument-is more substantial,
but it can be countered with other policy arguments, some of
which are stated in the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Agins:s2 (a) the threat of inverse condemnation actions "would
have a chilling effect upon the exercise of police regulatory powers
at a local level" and "discourage the implementation of strict or
innovative planning measures"; (b) it is unfair to treat what the
local governing body thought was a police power regulation as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain; (c) inverse condemnation
judgments might impose excessive financial burdens on local gov-
ernments and make annual budgeting difficult, especially where
land use regulations are adopted by the people through direct initi-
ative; (d) "it seems [an] usurpation of legislative power for a court
to force [payment of] compensation"; and (e) determination of the
property interest taken and the amount of compensation to be
paid will often be difficult.
The third argument for the inverse condemnation remedy in
regulatory taking cases is also substantial. The ability of local gov-
ernments to play games with a plaintiff who has been successful in
a suit to invalidate a zoning regulation 3 presents a problem for
81. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
491 (1981).
82. 24 Cal. 3d at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (1979). See also Baum-
gardner, supra note 80, at 738. The amicus curiae briefs filed in San Diego argue that a
constitutional damage remedy should not be implied since (1) injunctive relief would be
adequate, (2) courts should not intervene in matters involving legislative prerogative, and
(3) such a remedy would cause "wholesale disruption of government resources and greatly
inhibit legitimate regulation, particularly, but not exclusively, in the land use area." 33
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 1, p.5 (1981).
83. Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 93 IlM. App. 2d 24, 235 N.E.2d 23 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969); Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 76 Ill. App. 2d 62, 221 N.E.2d
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which no completely satisfactory solution has yet been found. But
recent judicial experiments in granting "definitive relief' to victo-
rious plaintiffs in land use cases" suggest that satisfactory solu-
tions are possible, and that it is not necessary, in order to deal with
the problem, to compel local governments to pay the value of a fee
simple or a restrictive easement in land they only intended to
regulate.
The fourth argument for the inverse condemnation remedy
originally sought by the plaintiff in San Diego may seem to be the
strongest of all. But the problem of losses caused by harsh land use
regulations while they are in force-that is, prior to judicial invali-
dation or legislative repeal or amendment-can be resolved by ap-
plication of the rule stated in Justice Brennan's first conclusion,
modified so as to make it clear that the courts may terminate a
"temporary" regulatory taking by declaring the regulation inva-
lid. 5 Alternatively, the federal courts might award the aggrieved
323 (1966).
84. See, e.g., Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 IMI. 2d 370, 167
N.E.2d 406 (1960); Brunette v. County of McHenry, 48 IlM. App. 3d 396, 363 N.E.2d 112
(1977); Aurora Nat'l Bank v. City of Aurora, 41 IMI. App. 3d 239, 353 N.E.2d 61 (1976); Ed
Zaagman, Inc. v. City of Kentwood, 406 Mich. 137, 277 N.W.2d 475 (1979); City of Rich-
mond v. Randall, 215 Va. 506, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975) (cases where the zoning of a particular
tract was held to be unreasonable). See also Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 548-52, 371 A.2d 1192, 1226-27 (1977); Berenson v. Town of New
Castle, 67 A.D.2d 506, 415 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1979) (cases where the whole zoning ordinance was
held to be unreasonably exclusionary). In Pennsylvania there is a statutory basis for grant-
ing definitive relief. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10609.1, 11004(1)(b), 11011(2) (Purdon 1980).
See Casey v. Zoning & Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974); Appeal of Abcon, Inc.,
35 Pa. Commnw. Ct. 589, 387 A.2d 1303 (1978); Board of Supervisors v. Barness, 33 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 364, 382 A.2d 140 (1978); Board of Supervisors v. Walsh, 20 Pa. Commw. Ct.
275, 341 A.2d 572 (1975); Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d
239 (1975).
85. Justice Brennan's repeated reference to legislative repeal or amendment is mysti-
fying, since a court will presumably invalidate any land use regulation it finds to be a "tem-
porary" de facto taking, leaving it to the local governing body to decide whether to "choose
formally to condemn the property" or to adopt a less restrictive land use regulation in the
hope that it will be held valid if challenged as a de facto taking.
In some of the cases where physical invasions of plaintiff's property have been held to
constitute a de facto taking, it is clear that the taking was only temporary. See, e.g., United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). For a case where a "temporary" regulatory taking was
found, see Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978), where the court held that
plaintiff had stated a cause of action directly under the Fourteenth Amendment for recovery
of "damages resulting from a taking of private property for public use without just compen-
sation" after the Michigan Supreme Court had invalidated the city ordinance found to con-
stitute a taking. See also Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975), where a
three.judge panel initially held that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action directly under the
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landowner damages under title 42 of the United States Code, sec-
tion 1983,18 after declaring the land use regulation invalid. In ei-
ther case, it may be impossible to recover consequential damages,
but it is at least possible that consequential damages could be re-
covered in a section 1983 action.
Although this writer in general approves the conclusions
reached by Justice Brennan in the San Diego case, this writer does
not share Justice Brennan's stated belief that these conclusions are
dictated by prior decisions of the Supreme Court. None of the Su-
preme Court cases relied upon by Justice Brennan held that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that compensation be awarded to
a landowner whenever the court finds that a regulatory taking has
occurred; nor does any of these cases suggest that any remedy
other than invalidation is constitutionally required, whether the
regulatory taking is permanent or only temporary. 7 Since none of
the cases relied upon involved an attempt by the landowner to in-
validate the land use regulations applicable to his land, any judi-
cial statements about compensation could only be dicta, in any
event. On the whole, this writer is inclined to agree with those who
assert that the word "taking" was used metaphorically in these
cases to describe an invalid exercise of the police power-invalid
because the land use regulations in question were too restrictive.e8
Consequently, this writer would prefer to see Justice Brennan's
conclusions in San Diego justified on the basis of the policy consid-
erations that support his interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
Fourteenth Amendment for recovery of damages for a "temporary" taking after the Ver-
mont Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance prohibiting use of their land for a
trailer park. On rehearing en banc, however, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a cause of action, even assuming that "a suit for damages can be founded directly on
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 738. In an action directly under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it is clear that a plaintiff must satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
86. This is the current codification of a portion of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 which
provides as follows: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1974). For further discussion of this statute see text at notes 97-99 infra.
87. See notes 8-16 and accompanying text, supra.
88. This view is rejected by Justice Brennan, who characterizes it as "tampering with
the express language of the opinion" in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922). 49 U.S.L.W. at 4324 n.14.
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ment as applied to regulatory taking cases,8 9 not on the theory that
the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied
to such cases is perfectly clear-so clear as to dictate the conclu-
sions reached by Justice Brennan. In fact, of course, even the ap-
plication of the Fifth Amendment to formal eminent domain pro-
ceedings is often far from clear; for example, it was far from clear
that the term "public use" in the taking clause of the Fifth
Amendment really meant "public purpose," as the Supreme Court
held in Berman v. Parker.9 0
IV. Regulatory Takings and Inverse
Condemnation: Looking to the Future
How will the state courts deal with inverse condemnation
claims based on allegations of regulatory taking, now that the Su-
preme Court has handed down its decision in San Diego? No
doubt most state courts will accept Justice Brennan's views, as
stated in San Diego, to be the best evidence of the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
applied to regulatory taking cases. Hence no state court will find
itself compelled to award the full market value of land as compen-
sation whenever a regulatory taking is found and the aggrieved
landowner demands compensation, and it is unlikely that many
state courts will adopt a rule requiring payment of such compensa-
tion on the basis of their own state constitutional provisions as to
taking or due process. Indeed, two of the most prestigious state
courts have already held that ompensation should not be awarded
on the theory of a "permanent" taking even if land use regulations
are found to deprive the landowner of any reasonable beneficial
use of his land."1 But state courts will presumably apply the new
89. See text after note 80, supra. See also Justice Brennan's discussion of policy con-
siderations, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4327 n.26. But he rejects such considerations as a basis for deter-
mining "the applicability of express constitutional guarantees." 49 U.S.L.W. at 4327.
90. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
91. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372
(1979); Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381,
385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). In the French case, the New York court rejected the inverse condem-
nation remedy sought by the plaintiff on the ground that compensable takings, where there
is "an actual appropriation... by title or governmental occupation" are different in kind
from a purported exercise of the police power, even though the latter "may impose so oner-
ous a burden on the property regulated that it has, in effect deprived the owner of the
reasonable income productive or other private use of his property and thus has destroyed its
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rule that deprivation of any reasonable beneficial use while very
restrictive land use regulations are in force must be treated as a
"temporary" taking for which compensation is required.92
Both the state and the federal courts will have to work out, on
a case by case basis, how "[o]rdinary principles determining the
proper measure of just compensation, regularly applied in cases of
permanent and temporary 'takings' involving formal condemnation
proceedings, occupations, and physical invasions," can be adapted
to provide principles for determining just compensation for "tem-
porary" regulatory takings. 3 This is likely to be a difficult task. It
is not very helpful to be told that, "[a]s a starting point, the value
of the property taken may be ascertained as of the date of the 'tak-
ing.' ,,4 In the San Diego case it is not clear that the plaintiff's
land would have been reduced in value by a merely "temporary"
regulatory taking, since the plaintiff had never applied for a devel-
opment permit or a variance, had not sought to have the restrictive
zoning and/or the open space designation of its land changed, and
had not shown that any viable development plan was frustrated by
the restrictive regulations alleged to amount to a regulatory taking.
In such a case, it is possible that courts will find that no compensa-
tion is required after the restrictive regulation has been invali-
dated. On the other hand, a landowner may clearly suffer substan-
tial consequential losses as a result of restrictive regulations that
interfere with a viable development plan. But in jurisdictions
economic value." Id. at 593, 350 N.E.2d at 385, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 8. Hence, the New York
court said, "[i]n all but exceptional cases ... such a regulation does not constitute a 'tak-
ing,'.. . but amounts to a deprivation or frustration of property without due process of law
and is therefore invalid." Id. This view was reiterated in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). When the United
States Supreme Court reviewed Penn Central, it rejected the view that regulation can never
amount to a "taking," but did not suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment requires pay-
ment of compensation rather than invalidation when a regulatory "taking" occurs. See 438
U.S. 104, 123 n. 25 (1978).
92. See Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968),
where the court upheld a statute authorizing a municipality, upon application for approval
of a land subdivision, to reserve for one year, for future public use, any land within the
proposed subdivision shown on the official map as a park or playground, but also held that
the municipality must compensate the landowner for a temporary taking by paying the
value of a one-year option to purchase the land reserved. The court said such compensation
was required both by the New Jersey Constitution and by the Fourteenth Amendment. The
compensation requirement is now codified in N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-44 (West Supp.
1976).
93. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
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where the eminent domain provision prohibits only a taking of pri-
vate property for public use, consequential damages generally can-
not be recovered. 5
Justice Brennan apparently assumes that in cases of "tempo-
rary" regulatory taking landowners may sue local governments di-
rectly under the Fourteenth Amendment in either the state or fed-
eral courts. Thus a landowner could sue, either in a state or federal
court, (1) to invalidate unduly restrictive land use regulations and
(2), at the same time, to recover compensation for a "temporary"
taking during the time when the regulations were in force. Alterna-
tively, it seems that a landowner could sue in a federal court for
the same kinds of relief under title 42 of the United States Code,
section 1983.ee It is now settled that municipalities and other local
government units are "persons" and may therefore be liable under
section 1983, . 7 that the good faith of local government officials
whose actions deprive a "person" of federal constitutional or statu-
tory rights does not immunize the local government from such lia-
bility,98 and that there is a cause of action under section 1983 when
one is deprived of property without due process of law.99
It is true, as Professor Mandelker points out in his symposium
article, that the federal courts have held that the section 1983 does
not create a right to recover money damages in all circum-
stances.1'0 But where invalidation of harsh land use regulations
leaves the landowner with uncompensated losses caused by the in-
valid regulations, it seems likely that the federal courts will award
damages under the Act. The existence of such a remedy is clearly
implied in Gordon v. City of Warren.1 1 Although the damage rem-
95. With some exceptions, "consequential damages" are not recoverable under state
constitutional provisions requiring compensation only when private property is "taken" for
public use. But more than half the state constitutions contain provisions requiring compen-
sation when private property is either "takeA or damaged" for public use. Under the latter
provisions, consequential damages may be recovered. EumMNT DOMAIN, supra note 3, at §
14.1(1). California has a "taken or damaged" clause in its constitution, and this may have
been the basis for the trial judge's award of appraisal, engineering and attorneys' fees total-
ing $122,559.07 in San Diego.
96. See note 86 supra.
97. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruling, City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1960).
98. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
99. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1978).
100. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CoNeS.
L.Q. 491 (1981).
101. See note 86 supra.
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edy was denied in Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,102 the court's decision was based largely on the fact that
the defendant had neither the power of eminent domain nor the
power to levy and collect taxes, being dependent upon California
and Nevada for funds.10 8 In addition, the Jacobson Court adduced
the same policy arguments summarized above for holding that "the
landowner should not have an option to sue for damages rather
than to attack the validity of a zoning regulation which allegedly
has diminished the market value of the property."' ' In the more
usual case where the defendant is a unit of local government with
the power of eminent domain and the power to tax, however, a
court may well be willing both to invalidate a regulation that
amounts to a de facto taking and to award damages for losses
caused by the regulation while it was in force.105
It is possible that the federal courts will apply the federal ab-
stention doctrine and refuse to consider actions for compensation
for "temporary" regulatory takings, whether they are based di-
rectly on the Fourteenth Amendment or on section 1983. As Pro-
fessor Mandelker points out in his symposium article, "[w]hile the
United States Supreme Court has not yet considered the federal
abstention doctrine in land use taking cases, several lower federal
courts have applied federal abstention to decline jurisdiction in
cases of this type." 1°0 But there are many regulatory taking cases
where the lower federal courts have not declined jurisdiction,0 7 in-
cluding one case where the state courts first invalidated the chal-
102. 474 F. Supp. 901 (D. Nev. 1979).
103. Id. at 903.
104. Id. at 903-04. Although these arguments are persuasive when declaratory and in-
junctive relief will provide an adequate remedy, the Jacobson Court conceded that such
relief was unavailable to the plaintiffs, "inasmuch as they owned no interest in the subject
property at the time suit was commenced." Id. at 902. See also Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978).
105. Cf. Professor Mandelker's view of the Jacobson case, Mandelker, Land Use Tak-
ings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 491 (1981).
106. See discussion of the doctrine in Professor Mandelker's symposium paper, id. at
514. Also see Note, Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine,
89 YALE L.J. 1134 (1980).
107. Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978) (action brought under
14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)); Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated, 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Dahl
v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of
Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp. 947 (D.N.H. 1971), afi'd, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). See also
Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1976).
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lenged land use regulation and the federal court then held that the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment for compensation on the basis of the temporary taking
that occurred while the regulation was in force.108 Although some
federal courts may be disposed to decline jurisdiction when a land-
owner initially challenges the validity of local land use regulations,
on the theory that "[flederal courts must be wary of intervention
that will stifle innovative state efforts to find solutions to complex
social problems,"'1 9 it would seem that courts may be more willing
to award compensation or damages for the temporary taking in
cases where the local regulations are held invalid by state courts on
taking grounds.
A landowner who seeks both to invalidate a harsh land use
regulation as a de facto taking and to recover compensation for
losses caused by the regulation while it was in force should be able
to obtain substantially the same relief whether the action is based
directly on the Fourteenth Amendment or on section 1983. A sec-
tion 1983 action, however, would also, it seems, allow recovery of
damages where the land use regulation is held invalid solely be-
cause its purpose is improper, or the means chosen to achieve its
purpose is unreasonable, or the regulation denies the plaintiff
equal protection of the laws-cases in which a court would ordina-
rily not find a de facto taking. And, since section 1983 has been
said to create "a species of tort liability," 10 it-may be possible for a
landowner to recover for consequential losses not compensable
under ordinary constitutional taking clauses.""
To allow a landowner both to sue for invalidation of a harsh
land use regulation and for compensation (or damages) for the
losses caused by the regulation while it was in force would, to a
considerable extent, reconcile the opposing policy arguments previ-
ously noted in connection with the question whether courts should
either limit aggrieved landowners to the remedy of invalidation or
award them compensation on the basis of a permanent regulatory
taking. Such a solution of the problem would require local govern-
108. Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1978).
109. Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir.
1976), quoted in Sederquist v. City of Tiburon, 590 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cr. 1979). Sederquist
contains a good discussion of criteria for applying the abstention doctrine in land use con-
trol cases.
110. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978).
111. See note 95 supra.
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ment decisionmakers to consider more seriously the economic im-
pact of proposed land use regulations on landowners, and would
assure compensation for most losses suffered by landowners as a
result of invalid regulations; but it would have a less chilling effect
on "the implementation of strict or innovative planning measures"
by "the exercise of police regulatory powers at a local level," would
impose smaller financial burdens on local governments when their
land use regulations are declared invalid, and would involve less
"usurpation of legislative power" than a judicial rule mandating
payment of compensation on the basis of a permanent regulatory
taking.
